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  MODERNIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW  
AS A FORM OF CONVERGENCE 
 
  
 
The necessity for the continuous adaptation of the law to the needs of time, if the law is not 
eventually to break down, is a fundamental problem deserving of extensive consideration. 
 
- Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Modernization of the Law, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 433, 433 (1951) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Historians of European competition law will undoubtedly consider 1 May 2004 an epoch.  On 
this date, not only will the European Union (“EU”) experience its largest single growth when ten 
new countries accede to the EU,
1 but also a number of major reforms of European competition 
law will become effective.  Although the competition law reforms address a broad array of 
specific issues, they are generally considered an attempt by the Commission to modernize its 
competition law enforcement to create greater administrative efficiency and reduce compliance 
costs on firms.  The modernization efforts should not be viewed in a vacuum.  They are taking 
place at a time of increased public awareness of the tension between European and U.S. 
competition law.  The divergent results reached by the U.S. and European antitrust agencies in 
the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas,
2 Microsoft
3 and GE/Honeywell
4 cases are just three examples of 
the public attention which the parallel application of competition law in a globalized world can 
attract when it leads to different results.  Harmonization has been proposed as a method by which 
to address the conflict which often ensues from the parallel application of the competition laws.  
Although the European Commission has not formally recognized convergence with U.S. antitrust 
law as one of the objectives of the modernization process, this will be one of the unintended 
results.  This contribution will first identify the main components of the European Commission’s 
modernization efforts.  It will then explain how the modernization will result in convergence 
between U.S. and European competition law. 
 
                                                           
1 On May 1, 2004, the following countries will become members of the European Community thereby increasing the 
number of Member States to 25:  Malta, Slovenia, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Lithuania and Cyprus. 
2 Commission Decision of 30 July 1997 declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the 
functioning of the EEA Agreement, O.J. 1997 (L 336) 16 (Boeing/McDonnell Douglas). 
3 Commission Press Release, Commission gives Microsoft last opportunity to comment before concluding its 
antitrust probe, IP/03/1150, Aug. 6, 2003; DoJ’s James warns EC against use of ‘monopoly leveraging’ argument 
in Microsoft, GLOBAL  COMPETITION  REVIEW, May 20, 2002 available at 
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/news_item.cfm?item_id=264. 
4 Commission Decision of 3 July 2001 declaring a concentration incompatible with the common market and the 
EEA Agreement, O.J. 2004 (L 48) 1 (General Electric/Honeywell); Stefan Schmitz, How Dare They - European 
Merger Control and the European Commission's Blocking of the General Electric/Honeywell Merger, 23 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 325 (2002).   2 
Objectives of the Modernization Program 
 
Modernization is all the rage.  Whereas the European Commission introduced its modernization 
program several years ago, the United States recently created an Antitrust Modernization 
Commission which is charged with preparing a report on the necessity of modernization of U.S. 
antitrust laws.
5  The modernization initiatives being discussed in the United States were 
prompted primarily by the perceived inability of the existing legal norms to appropriately address 
new forms of commerce and the increased importance of intellectual property.  In contrast, the 
modernization efforts in the EU were in response to the regulatory inefficiencies and the burdens 
which the traditional enforcement of the competition laws imposed.  As early as 1996, the 
Commission recognized that “the current political and economic situation necessitates the 
continuous modernization of the instruments and procedures available to the Commission, in 
order to improve the relevance, efficiency and transparency of competition policy.”
6 
 
  The notion of efficiency, which is commonly applied to the conduct of private 
commercial actors, has been used to gauge administrative behavior.  In general, the 
modernization effort in the EU is designed to increase efficiency in the enforcement of the 
European competition rules.
7  Competition is used by market economies to determine the proper 
allocation of scarce resources.  Ironically, there is a general consensus in free market economies 
that the proper functioning of a “free” market necessitates state intervention in the market.  In 
other words, competition is not considered to be self-regulating.  Moreover, a purely competitive 
market will not always yield the most socially desirable or politically acceptable results.  These 
recognitions legitimize state intervention in the competitive process in the form of the 
enforcement of legal norms prohibiting certain business conduct.  State intervention results in 
outcomes which the market would not otherwise render.  Determining when and how to intervene 
requires significant administrative resources.  Moreover, compliance with the legal norms 
designed to protect competition and with the regulatory procedures adopted to assist in that 
process imposes costs on firms.  From an administrative efficiency perspective, these costs 
should only be imposed on firms engaged in conduct which the legal norms applicable in that 
territory consider to be anti-competitive.  An efficient competition law regime is that which 
achieves the objectives of the legislation while imposing the lowest costs on the state and the 
subjects of the law.  Anti-competitive conduct should not go undetected; but pro-competitive 
conduct should not be burdened. 
 
  Similar to the Sherman Act, the European competition laws codified in Articles 81 and 82 
of the EC Treaty
8 are formulated in broad terms.  They basically prohibit unilateral, bi-lateral and 
multilateral restraints of competition.  In recognition of the broad character of the prohibition, the 
drafters of the Treaty of Rome empowered the Council in Article 83(1) of the EC Treaty to adopt 
the appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the prohibitions contained in Articles 81 
and 82 of the EC Treaty.  In reliance on this authority, the Council adopted Regulation 17 in 
                                                           
5 21
st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002). 
6 Commissioner Karel Van Miert, Presentation of 25th Report on Competition Policy, European Parliament (May 
30, 1996) available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1996_044_en.html. 
7 See Philip Lowe, Priorities of Competition Policy, Contribution to Competitiveness and Challenges from 
Enlargement, Speech at the ProbusBNW Dialogue (Sept. 18, 2003) at 2. 
8 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 as amended [hereinafter 
EC Treaty].   3 
1962.
9  Although Regulation 17 was adopted before the Community had significant experience 
with the application of the competition laws, it survived with relatively few changes for 42 years. 
 
  Regulation 17 was adopted at an early stage in the development of European competition 
law.  Although it worked effectively (with some creative interpretations by the Commission and 
the European Court of Justice) for several decades, there was general, but not uniform 
recognition that revisions were necessary.
10  The term “modernization” as currently employed in 
European competition law circles refers to changes in the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of 
the EC Treaty and in particular Regulation 17. The fundamental objectives of the reform efforts 
are to facilitate a reallocation of administrative and enforcement resources, promote the 
decentralized application of the competition rules and reduce the compliance costs imposed on 
firms.
11  The changes are codified in Council Regulation 1/2003 which comes into force on May 
1, 2004 and replaces Regulation 17.
12  According to the preamble of Regulation 1/2003: 
 
[T]here is a need to rethink the arrangements for applying the exception from the 
prohibition on agreements, which restrict competition, laid down in Article 81(3) 
of the Treaty. …The centralised scheme set up by Regulation No 17 no longer 
secures a balance between those two objectives. It hampers application of the 
Community competition rules by the courts and competition authorities of the 
Member States, and the system of notification it involves prevents the 
Commission from concentrating its resources on curbing the most serious 
infringements. It also imposes considerable costs on undertakings.
13 
 
 
Parallel Reform Efforts 
 
The modernization program involving the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty is 
just one component in a broader effort to enhance the efficiency of the application of the 
European competition laws and, by reducing the compliance costs on European firms, increase 
the competitiveness of European industry in a globalized economy.
14  As it is sometimes difficult 
for the casual observer to maintain an understanding of all of the reform efforts in the field of 
                                                           
9 Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13 J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 87. 
10 The Germans were the most vociferous opponents of the reform effort. Möschel, Ex ante-Kontrolle versus ex 
post-Kontrolle im Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 52 JAHRBACH FÜR DIE ORDNUNG VON WIRTSCHAFT UND 
GESELLSCHAFT 63, 68 (2001); Mestmäcker, Versuch einer kartellpolitischen Wende in der EU - Zum Weißbuch der 
Kommission über die Modernisierung der Vorschriften zur Anwendung der Artt. 85 und 86 EGV a.F. (Artt. 81 und 
82 EGV n.F.), 17 EUROPÄISCHE  ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 523-529 (1999); Karsten Schmidt, 
Umdenken im Kartellverfahrensrecht!, 2003 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1237. 
11 White Paper on Modernization of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, O.J. 1999 (C 132) 
1 at ¶42. 
12 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Art. 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. 2003 (L 1) 1 [hereinafter Regulation 1/2003]. 
13 Preamble points 2 & 3 Regulation 1/2003. 
14 The EU has been engaged in an extended effort to examine ways to promote the competitiveness of European 
businesses.  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Committee of the 
Regions and the Economic and Social Committee, The competitiveness of European enterprises in the face of 
globalisation:  how it can be encouraged, COM (1998) 718 final (Jan. 20, 1999).  The modernization of the 
competition laws is just one aspect of this overall program.   4 
competition law, a brief summary of the other major projects currently underway or reforms 
recently adopted may be of assistance. 
 
 
Reform of the Block Exemptions 
 
Ancillary to the modernization program, the European Commission is in the process of revising 
(or has recently revised) several of the “block exemptions.”  Block exemptions are regulations 
which identify categories of agreements which benefit from the exception provided for in Article 
81(3) of the EC Treaty.  Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty prohibits restraints of competition which 
may have an effect on trade between the EU member states.  Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty 
identifies four requirements which, if cumulatively fulfilled, allow conduct infringing Article 
81(1) to be permitted because of its redeeming characteristics.  According to Article 81(3) of the 
EC Treaty, the prohibition of anti-competitive conduct codified in Article 81(1) may be declared 
inapplicable if the conduct contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit.  However, the conduct must only impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions 
which are necessary to the attainment of the redeeming objectives and must not afford the firms 
the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the relevant products 
or services.  As the requirements for an exemption are phrased in broad terms, the block 
exemptions attempt to apply those standards to specific agreements and even clauses.
15  Although 
the various block exemptions are different, they generally identify, for each type of agreement to 
which they apply, the types of clauses which are permissible, those which are prohibited and 
those which may be permissible in certain circumstances.  As the introduction of the new rules 
during the modernization process will require firms and their legal advisors to apply the 
requirements of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty without the possibility of notifying the agreement 
to the European Commission, these revised block exemptions will be important to the success of 
the modernization efforts. 
 
 
Introduction of New Merger Control Regulation 
 
The Commission has also been intensely preoccupied with the reform of the Merger Control 
Regulation for the last several years.  Until 1989, the Commission did not have a law which 
adequately applied to structural restraints of competition.  Article 81 of the EC Treaty was 
directed at bi-lateral or multilateral restraints of competition.  Article 82 of the EC Treaty applied 
to unilateral restraints of competition.
16  In recognition of this shortcoming, the Council adopted 
                                                           
15 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, O.J. 1999 (L 336) 21; Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 1400/2002 of 31 July 2002 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector, O.J. 2002 (L 203) 30; Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of technology 
transfer agreements, O.J. 1996 (L 31) 2 (currently being revised); Commission Regulation No. 358/2003 of 27 
February 2003 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices in the insurance sector, O.J. 2003 (L 53) 8. 
16 Although Article 82 was sometimes applied to mergers prior to the introduction of the first Merger Control 
Regulation, this was an inadequate solution as it did not prevent the merger from occurring.  Case 6/72,   5 
the Merger Control Regulation in 1989.
17  The law was revised in 1997 to capture mergers which 
had to be notified in several Member States.
18  This time, the Commission decided to adopt an 
entirely new Regulation which builds upon the experience and problems which the Commission 
has encountered over the last 14 years of merger control.
 19 
 
  In addition to a number of procedural changes relating to the allocation of jurisdiction 
between the Commission and the Member States and the various time periods for submission and 
review of notifications, the revised Merger Control Regulation changes the substantive test which 
is employed by the Commission to determine whether a change in the structure of competition as 
a result of the merger is to be approved.
20  Previously, the standard for determining the 
permissibility of a merger was whether the transaction created or strengthened a dominant 
position.  The new standard is whether the merger “significantly impede[s] effective competition 
… in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.”
21  As with 
many European legal norms, the unnecessarily confusing formulation of the substantive standard 
– arguably the most important provision of the law – is the result of a political compromise 
between the Member States which advocated the adoption of a test similar to that of the U.S. 
(whether the merger substantially lessens competition) and those Member States which 
advocated retaining the original substantive test (whether the merger creates or strengthens a 
dominant position).  The practical significance of the introduction of this new standard remains to 
be seen.  The recitals to the Merger Control Regulation suggest that the notion of “significant 
impediment to effective competition” is only meant to extend the traditional standard to mergers 
which will result in co-ordination between non-dominant firms (“unilateral effects” in U.S. 
antitrust parlance).
22  The prior Merger Control Regulation did not apply in such cases as it was 
limited to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. 
 
 
Institutional Reforms 
 
Finally, the Commission has recognized that the internal structure of the Competition Directorate 
did not enhance the efficient application of the competition laws.  Consequently, it has exhibited 
a willingness to restructure the Competition Directorate in several meaningful ways.
23  When the 
Merger Control Regulation was introduced in 1990, the Commission created a Merger Task 
Force within the Competition Directorate (then DGIV) with responsibility for review of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215.  The Commission was consequently forced 
to unwind the merger if it was considered an abuse of a dominant position. 
17 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, O.J. 1989 (L 395) 1. 
18 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 on the control of 
concentrations between undertaking, O.J. 1997 (L 180) 1. 
19 Council Regulation No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, O.J. 
2004 (L 24) 1 [hereinafter Merger Control Regulation]. 
20 The Commission’s Notice on Horizontal Mergers will enter into force on the same date as the Merger Control 
Regulation.  In that Notice, the Commission recognizes the importance of efficiencies in the substantive review of 
mergers. 
21 Article 2(2) Merger Control Regulation. 
22 Recital 25 Merger Control Regulation. 
23 Commission reorganises its Competition Department in advance of Enlargement, IP/03/603 (April 30, 2003).   6 
mergers.
24  The Commission has decided to integrate the Merger Task Force into the rest of the 
Competition Directorate.  The Merger Task Force will continue as a small staff responsible for 
the coordination (but not substantive review) of merger cases across the EU.  The members of the 
Merger Task Force have been integrated into the sector-specific units of the Competition 
Directorate.  In addition, each of the sector-specific units will be responsible for the detection of 
cartels, a task that was previously in the hands of a separate unit.  The Commission felt that this 
sector-specific approach would assist in a more efficient application of the laws because of the 
enhanced understanding of specific industries which will be gained by the individuals working in 
these units.  Finally, in a development which warms the heart of many U.S. practitioners, the 
Commission has introduced the office of Chief Economist reporting directly to the Director 
General who is head of the Competition Directorate.  This development is meant to assuage the 
concerns and criticisms of many that the competition law decisions of the European Commission 
– particularly merger decisions – are wanting of proper economic rigor. 
 
 
The Main Components of the Commission’s Modernization Program 
 
Modernization, in a narrow sense, refers specifically to the introduction of Regulation 1/2003 and 
the “modernization package” comprised of six notices issued by the European Commission to 
assist in the interpretation and application of the new rules codified in Regulation 1/2003.   
Although Regulation 1/2003 introduces a large number of changes, only the main components 
are addressed here. 
 
 
Abolition of Antiquated Notification System 
 
Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty prohibits agreements and concerted practices between 
undertakings and decisions of associations of undertakings which appreciably restrict 
competition and have an effect on trade between Member States.  Conduct which falls under this 
prohibition is automatically void unless it satisfies the requirements for an exception under Art. 
81(3) of the EC Treaty.  Under Regulation 17, the parties were required to apply to the 
Commission for an individual exemption.  Conduct which fulfilled the requirements set forth in 
Art. 81(3) could not benefit from an exemption unless a notification was submitted to the 
Commission. 
 
  Because of the very broad interpretation given to the notion of “restriction of 
competition” in the context of Art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty, this system created almost a 
presumption of illegality.  Moreover, the early rejection of the U.S. rule of reason approach to 
identifying restraint of competition resulted in a flood of notifications beyond what the 
Commission could handle.  Article 81(1) and Section 1 of the Sherman Act are similar in that 
they both essentially prohibit restraints of competition.  In Standard Oil v. U.S., the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized that contracts by their very nature restrict the commercial freedom of 
the parties and held that not every restraint of the commercial freedom of a market actor is to be 
equated with a restraint of competition for purposes of antitrust law.
25  Only agreements which 
                                                           
24 See JOSE RIVAS, THE EU MERGER REGULATION AND THE ANATOMY OF THE MERGER TASK FORCE (2000). 
25 221 U.S. 1 (1911).   7 
are “unreasonable” were prohibited.  Under the “rule of reason,” the factfinder weighs all of the 
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be considered a restraint 
of competition.
26 
  The Europeans rejected this approach relatively early.  As a result of the German 
influence,
27 particularly in the initial stages of development of the European competition law 
regime, the Commission
28 and the Court
29 have traditionally equated a restraint of competition in 
the context of Art. 81(1) EC Treaty with a restraint of the commercial freedom of an otherwise 
autonomous market actor. In applying Art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty, the Commission and Courts 
have traditionally disregarded the pro-competitive effects or “efficiencies” of the agreement.  In 
fact, the Court has expressly refused to apply a rule of reason in the content of Art. 81(1).
30  The 
test applied by the Commission and hence practitioners was whether the agreement restricted the 
commercial freedom of one of the parties or a third party.  The redeeming characteristics were 
only considered in the context of Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty which only applied if the parties 
notified the transaction to the Commission. 
  Regulation 1/2003 does not introduce a new substantive standard or interpretation of the 
concept “restraint of competition.”  It does, however, eliminate the bifurcated approach to the 
application of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty.  Regulation 1/2003 abolishes the requirement that parties 
must submit a notification to the Commission in order to take advantage of the exemption 
possibility under Art. 81(3).  In the new system, conduct which violates Art. 81(1) of the EC 
Treaty but which satisfies the conditions for an exemption under Art. 81(3) EC Treaty is 
automatically exempted from the prohibition.
31  The Commission refers to this as the “legal 
                                                           
26 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
27 For a discussion of the various influences on the development of European competition law see DAVID J. GERBER, 
LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH  CENTURY  EUROPE  (1998) 164;  David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the 
Economy: German Neoliberalism, Competition Law and the “New” Europe, 42 AM.  J.  COMP.  L. 25 (1994).   
Although it is extremely difficult to quantify the German influence on the early development of European 
competition law, a reading of the transcripts of the Proceedings of the Conference on Antitrust and the European 
Communities which was held in Brussels and Luxembourg in September of 1963 make this influence evident.  Most 
of the Germans active in the field of competition law at the European level were nurtured in the ordo-liberal 
tradition.  Ordo-liberal economics places a primary emphasis on individual freedom.  The fundamental purpose of 
competition policy from an Ordo-liberal perspective is “the protection of individual economic freedom of action as a 
value in itself.” Wernhard Möschel, The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an Ordoliberal Perspective: The 
Example of Competition Policy, 157 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECONOMICS 3, 4 (2001).  Consequently, a 
restraint of competition was conceptually equated with a restraint of the commercial freedom of market actors.  
28 Visa International, O.J. L 318 (2002) 17 ¶64; BP/Kellogg, O.J. L 369 (1985) p. 6 ¶ 15; UIP, O.J. 1989 (L 226) 25 
¶40; Commission, 23
rd R EPORT ON COMPETITION  POLICY (1994) ¶ 160; Industrieverband Solnhofener 
Natursteinplatten, Commission Decision of Oct. 16, 1980, O.J. 1980 (L 318) 32 ¶27; Toltecs-Dorcet, Commission 
Decision of Dec. 15, 1982, O.J. 1982 (L 379) 19 ¶II.3(a); Commission Decision of July 15, 1992, O.J. 1992 (L 233) 
27 ¶16; Junghans, Commission Decision of Dec. 21, 1976, O.J. 1977 (L 30) 10 ¶21; DSD, Commission Decision of 
Sept. 17, 2001, O.J. 2001 (L 319) 1 ¶123; Nathan-Bricolux, Commission Decision of July 5, 2000, O.J. 2000 (L 54) 
1 ¶75. 
29 Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. __ ¶98; Case C-306/96, Javico 
International and Javico AG v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA, 1998 E.C.R. I-1983 ¶13; Case 193/83, Windsurfing 
International v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 611, 653; Case 107/82, AEG v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3151 ¶60; Case 
86/82, Hasselblad v. Commission, 1984 E.C.R. 883, 908. 
30 The reasoning adopted by the Court was that the application of a rule of reason in the context of Art. 81(1) would 
devoid the Art. 81(3) exception of any meaning.  Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd. v. Commission, 2003 
E.C.R. __ ¶106; Case T-112/99, Métropole télévision v. Commission, 2001 E.C.R. II-2459, ¶77. 
31 Article 1(2) Regulation 1/2003.     8 
exception system.”
32  The Commission has indicated, however, that in cases which present novel 
legal questions, it would be prepared to issue “guidance letters” to the parties.
33 
 
  The significance of the abolition of the notification requirement is greater than may be 
readily apparent.  Prior to the introduction of the reforms, the application for an exemption under 
Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty was subject to detailed rules and compliance with an extensive 
notification form.
34  If the notification system was designed to detect illicit anti-competitive 
agreements, it was not a success.  There have been relatively few instances in which a 
notification not prompted by a complaint resulted in a finding of anti-competitive agreement.
35 
 
  The abolition of the notification requirement will also have an effect on the strategic 
approach taken by practitioners to joint ventures.  In the old regime, there were certain benefits 
of qualifying as a concentration with a Community dimension under the Merger Control 
Regulation.  In such cases, the application of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty and national law to the 
transaction was precluded, and the Commission had a set timeframe in which to review and 
approve or contest the transaction.  Upon the expiry of that time, the parties had legal certainty 
that their transaction was commensurate with applicable European competition law.   
Notifications for exemption under Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty, however, fell into the European 
Commission’s black hole.  The Commission was under no legal time pressure to review and pass 
judgment on the notification.  It was not uncommon for the Commission’s review to take three 
years.  In the new regime, however, the time consideration for attempting to avoid the 
application of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty by structuring the transaction as a concentration no 
longer exists.  In fact, the parties no longer even have the opportunity to file a notification.  From 
a purely time perspective, then, the review process under the Merger Control Regulation is 
longer than the application of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty. 
 
  There are, however, tradeoffs.  Parties, whose transaction falls under the Merger Control 
Regulation, will have the legal certainty that they are in compliance with applicable European 
competition law.  In the system introduced by Regulation 1/2003, the parties will not know for 
certain whether their agreement amounts to a restraint of competition or even qualifies for an 
exemption.
36  Moreover, the Merger Control Regulation precludes the application of Member 
State law altogether.
37  
 
 
Relinquishment of the Exemption Monopoly 
 
Not only will the exception be automatically applicable, the national competition authorities will 
now have the authority to determine whether the requirements of Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty are 
                                                           
32 Commission, 22nd REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY (2002), SEC(2003) 467 final, at 16 ¶17. 
33 Mario Monti, EU Competition Policy After May 2004, SPEECH/03/489 (Oct. 24, 2003) at 5. 
34 Commission Regulation (EC) No 3385/94 of 21 December 1994 on the form, content and other details of 
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752, 753 (1999-2000). 
36 Although the Commission has declared the willingness to provide guidance letters, it will only do so for novel 
legal questions or factual constellations.   
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fulfilled.
38  Under Regulation 17, the European Commission had a monopoly on this right.  The 
fundamental purpose of the relinquishment of the exemption monopoly is to allow the 
Commission to allocate greater resources to the detection of more severe restraints of 
competition.
39 
 
  The application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty by the national competition authorities 
and courts will present two major challenges.  The first challenge arises out of the ambiguous 
wording of Article 81(3).  The exception requirements of Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty are 
inherently vague, and perhaps purposely so.
40  Under this provision, conduct which infringes Art. 
81(l) may be permitted if the conduct “contributes to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of 
the resulting benefit, and which does not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions 
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives or afford such undertakings the 
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.”  
The application by the various Member States of this ambiguous standard in the absence of 
established case law or even an agreed legal tradition would have threatened the effectiveness of 
a European competition law regime.  Primarily for that reason, only the Commission was 
permitted to grant exceptions under Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty.
41 
 
  Even if we assume that the national authorities and courts can resist the national bias 
which some in the Commission feel they can,
42 one must recognize that competition law, and in 
particular the types of standards which the application of Art. 81(3) requires, will legitimately 
vary between societies and cultures.  Legislation, by necessity, must be formulated in abstract 
language.  Not even the most enlightened legislator is able to contemplate every factual 
constellation to which the statute he or she is drafting may apply.  The entity charged with the 
application of that law in specific cases must by necessity be accorded a certain degree of 
discretion.  In exercising that discretion, the person applying the statute unavoidably has recourse 
to his or her own expectations, knowledge and experience.  These limitations, which are largely 
shaped by the social and cultural context in which that individual matured and operates, will 
unavoidably have an influence on the application of the legal norm in specific cases.  For many 
years the Commission has distinguished the application of European competition law from U.S. 
antitrust law based on different social and cultural contexts in which the laws are applied.  One 
wonders whether the cultural differences between Sweden and Greece, for example, are any less 
than those between the UK and the U.S.  The diversity of the Member States will produce diverse 
outcomes of the application of the same legal norm. 
 
                                                           
38 Article 5 Regulation 1/2003. 
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42 Wouter Wils, The Modernization of the Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC: A Legal and Economic Analysis of 
the Commission’s Proposal for a New Council Regulation Replacing Regulation No. 17, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. 
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  The second challenge arises out of the lack of guidance from the European courts 
interpreting the exception requirements of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty.  In contrast to the 
prohibition contained in Art. 81(1) or the Merger Control Regulation, the European courts have 
granted the Commission an extremely broad deference in the interpretation and application of 
Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty.
43  The standard position of the courts is that they defer to the 
assessment of the Commission because the application of the requirements set forth in Art. 81(3) 
involves a “complex economic appraisal” which the Commission is in a better position to make.
44  
According to the Court, its review of the Commission’s interpretation of Art. 81(3) “must be 
limited to verifying whether the rules on procedure and on the giving of reasons have been 
complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated, and whether there has been any 
manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers.”
45  Consequently, there is very little case law 
upon which practitioners and national agencies can rely on to apply the broad requirements in 
individual cases.  Although the Commission has issued guidelines for the application of the four 
requirements of Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty,
46 even these guidelines are framed in very broad 
terms. 
 
 
Preemption of National Law 
 
The EC Treaty establishes a legal system sui generis which is separate from the legal systems of 
the respective Member States.  The Member States retain the authority to maintain their own 
laws applicable to competition between private firms.  The parallel application of national and 
EU competition law to the same facts necessitates conflict rules governing the relationship 
between these two independent legal regimes.  As part of the modernization process, the 
Commission introduced the rule that the Member States must apply the European competition 
rules to cases in which the national competition authorities intend to apply national competition 
law if there is at least a potential effect on trade between Member States.
47  In other words, at 
least two sets of laws will commonly apply to any anti-competitive conduct which has an effect 
on trade between Member States.  Given the broad interpretation given to inter-state trade 
requirement by the Court
48 and Commission,
49 the parallel application of competition law will 
occur in a significant number of cases. 
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213/95 and T-18/96, SCK and FNK v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. II-1739, ¶190; Case T-395/94, Atlantic Container 
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  In the event of parallel application of Community and national law, the general principle 
is that Community law is superior to national law in the case of conflict.  The critical issue 
involves determining when there is a conflict.  The parallel application of two legal norms to the 
same facts presents numerous possible constellations.  The cases in which the conduct is 
consistent with both European and national competition law do not present a problem.  A greater 
challenge is when the application of the legal norms in specific cases derives differing results.  If 
an agreement or concerted is permissible at the European level because it does not infringe Art. 
81(1) of the EC Treaty, meets the requirements of Art. 81(3) EC Treaty or qualifies for an 
exemption under one of the block exemptions, national competition law may not be applied to 
prohibit such agreement or concerted practice.
50  This rule does not preempt the application of 
national laws which pursue a different objective.  For example, national rules regulating unfair 
contract terms may still be applied by the Member States even though the agreement is consistent 
with Art. 81 of the EC Treaty.  This preemption of national law does not apply, however, to 
unilateral anti-competitive conduct.  The Member States may apply stricter national competition 
laws to unilateral conduct which may be consistent with Art. 82 of the EC Treaty.
51   
 
  National competition authorities are not prohibited from applying their national 
competition law to a particular transaction which does not have an effect on trade between 
Member States.  However, compliance with national competition law does not prevent the 
Commission from prohibiting the conduct based on European competition law.
52  If the conduct 
is, however, prohibited by European competition law but allowed by national law, the 
competition authorities of the Member States are required to apply the European competition law 
to prohibit the conduct provided that there is an effect on trade between Member States. 
 
  The parallel application of European competition law and national competition law by the 
same competition law authority presents the easy case.  The devolution of enforcement 
responsibility to the Member States will result in multiple national authorities applying 
competition law to the same conduct.  For example, the Commission retains the authority to 
apply the competition rules of the EC Treaty, but not the national competition rules.  A 
permissive ruling by a national authority or court cannot preclude the Commission from taking 
action.
53  If the Commission has already issued a decision in the case applying Art. 81 or 82, the 
national authorities and courts are precluded from taking decisions which would run counter to 
the decision adopted by the Commission.
54  If the Commission has merely initiated a proceeding, 
but not issued a decision, the authorities of the Member States must also avoid giving decisions 
which would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission.  To that effect, the 
national court may assess whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings.
55 
 
  Decisions by the Commission accepting commitments offered by the parties are another 
problem area.  Regulation 1/2003 does not preclude the possibility that the Commission open an 
investigation after the national authorities have concluded their investigation.  Nor does it 
preclude the possibility that several Member States investigate the same conduct.  The possibility 
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that the Commission and the national competition authority come to the same conclusion – that 
the conduct is prohibited under both European and national law – implicates the possibility of 
sanctioning firms twice for the sane conduct.  The principle ne bis in idem prevents the 
sanctioning of a person more than once for a single unlawful course of conduct based on the 
breach of a law which protects the same legal interest.
56 
 
  Decisions by the Commission accepting commitments offered by the parties are another 
problem area. Regulation 1/2003 clarifies the authority of the Commission to settle cases with 
companies which are targets of investigations.  If the Commission investigates specific conduct, 
and expresses its intention to order the parties to cease such conduct, the firms may offer 
commitments to the Commission to address the concerns of the Commission.
57  The Commission 
may then issue a decision accepting the commitments and that there are no longer grounds for 
action by the Commission.  The decision of the Commission in such a case does not, however, 
preclude the Member States from investigating the same conduct.  According to the preamble to 
Regulation 1/2003, “Commitment decisions are without prejudice to the powers of competition 
authorities and courts of the Member States to make such a finding and decide upon the case.”
58 
 
 
Importance of Inter-state Commerce Requirement 
 
The introduction of Regulation 1/2003 will place renewed focus on the requirement for the 
application of Art. 81 that there be an effect on trade between Member States.  As discussed 
above, the Member States, in applying their respective national competition laws to alleged anti-
competitive conduct, are required to also apply Art. 81 of the EC Treaty if there is an effect on 
trade between Member States.  As the Member States have separate legal norms regulating 
competition, the application of the requirement that EU competition law be applied to all 
transactions which have an effect on trade between Member States, could determine the outcome 
of the case.  If, for example, the application of national competition law would prohibit certain 
conduct, but that same conduct be permissible under EU law, all the parties need to do is to 
establish an effect on trade between Member States.   
 
  Although the Commission has issued a notice clarifying the inter-state trade 
requirement,
59 the Commission cannot alter the interpretation given to this requirement by the 
European courts.  The principle of legal certainty may even limit the Commission from altering 
its own broad interpretation applied in previous decisions.  The problem is that, similar to the 
inter-state commerce requirement of the Sherman Act, this requirement has been largely treated 
as a mere formality by the European Commission and the courts.  In the past, if the Commission 
or the courts were of the opinion that the particular conduct at issue amounted to an appreciable 
restraint of competition, it was unlikely that the requirement of an effect on trade between 
Member States would prevent the Commission or the court from prohibiting the conduct.  The 
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standard therefore became whether it may have an influence direct or indirect, actual or potential, 
on the pattern of trade between Member States.
60  According to the Court, “it is not necessary 
that the conduct in question should in fact have substantially affected trade between Member 
States. It is sufficient to establish that the conduct is capable of having such an effect.”
61 
 
  The reliance on this broad standard served the objectives of the Commission and the 
courts at the time.  It was, in part, prompted by the recognition that most of the Member States 
did not have a functioning competition law regime, and the necessity of maintaining some 
uniformity in the regulation of competition throughout the Community.  Until the introduction of 
the European Competition Network,
62 there was no formal mechanism by which to coordinate 
the application of national competition laws.  Moreover, the European courts, in recognition of 
the necessity for the Commission to establish itself as an effective regulatory body, gave the 
Commission broad deference in the application of the requirement.  Now, however, things have 
changed.  All the Member States have adopted competition laws and the courts have exhibited a 
greater willingness to scrutinize the decisions of the Commission.
63  European competition law is 
nonetheless stuck with the broad interpretation of the inter-state trade requirement. 
 
  Similar to the U.S., the broad interpretation of the inter-state trade requirement together 
with the preemption rules discussed above will have the effect of relegating the importance of 
national competition laws to a separate league.  National competition authorities will be forced to 
familiarize themselves with European competition law thereby diverting attention from the 
national laws.  Whether this will be a positive development remains to be seen.  It will, however, 
make the European system similar to the federalist antitrust law system in the U.S. 
 
  The potential problem concerns the lack of uniformity between the Member States in the 
application and enforcement of their respective competition laws.  Not only do the legal norms 
and the social contexts in which the application of national competition law will occur differ 
between Member States, there is a clear difference in the administrative and judicial enforcement 
practices of the Member States.  The applicability or inapplicability of European competition law 
to particular conduct may determine the outcome of the case.  As the applicability of competition 
law will depend on whether there is an effect on trade between Member States, this requirement 
will become an important consideration in the forum shopping of private practitioners. 
 
                                                           
60 Case T-202/98, British Sugar v. Commission, 2001 E.C.R. II - 2035¶78; Case 42/84, Remia v Commission, 1985 
E.C.R. 2545 ¶22; Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85, 
Ahlström Osakeyhtiö v. Commission 1993 E.C.R. I-1307 ¶143; Commission Decision of 24 July 2002, O.J. 2003 (L 
84) 1, 43 ¶363; Commission Decision of 11 December 2001, O.J. 2001 (L 15) 1, 27 ¶154. 
61 Case T-86/95, Compagnie Générale Maritime v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II-1011 ¶145; Case T-29/92 SPO v. 
Commission, 1995 E.C.R. II-289 
¶235.  
62 See Notice on the European Competition Network, O.J. 2004 (C____) ____. 
63 See e.g. Case T-67/01, JCB Service v. Commission, 2004 E.C.R. ___ (Jan. 13, 2004); Joined Cases C-2/01 P and 
C-3/01 P, Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV v. Commission, 2004 E.C.R. __; Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval 
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Internationalization, Harmonization and Convergence of Competition Laws 
 
Internationalization and harmonization are sometimes discussed as solutions for the problem 
caused by the extraterritorial application of competition laws.
64  The source of the conflict is the 
parallel application of the competition laws of two or more states to the same conduct where the 
application results in divergent legal conclusions.
65  The term “extraterritorial application of law” 
has unfortunately and unnecessarily assumed a pejorative character.  It suggests an illegitimate 
extension of the traditional bases of jurisdiction.  The principle of territoriality has served as the 
fundamental basis of jurisdiction in international law.
66  The jurisdiction of a state to apply its 
law was traditionally limited to the geographic territory over which that state held sovereignty. 
Even in the U.S., the Supreme Court initially required the conduct to have occurred in the U.S. 
for the Sherman Act to be applicable.
67  The effects which competition laws are intended to 
prevent, however, may occur in an entirely different state than where the perpetrators are located.  
The pure application of the territoriality principle of international law would allow companies to 
engage in anti-competitive practices without punishment as long as they were not present in the 
state in which their conduct had an effect.  However, the regulation of anti-competitive business 
practices is concerned with the location of the effects of those practices rather than the location 
of the actors. 
  The U.S. was the first legal system with a mature competition law to realize and address 
the jurisdictional challenge presented by legal norms regulating competition.  In U.S. v. 
Aluminum Co. of America, the Second Circuit held that the U.S. courts had jurisdiction over 
foreign defendants as long as the foreign conduct was intended to and actually did affect U.S. 
commerce.
68  The application of the “effects test”, as it became known in the U.S., was 
subsequently approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. 
California.
69   
  The extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law attracted significant criticism
70 and 
response from the Europeans in the form of blocking statutes.
71  However, once the Europeans 
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became serious about the application of their competition rules, they too faced the same dilemma 
caused by a strict application of the territoriality principle.  Initially the EC avoided having to 
rely on the effects doctrine by adopting the economic unit theory: if a company had affiliated 
companies in the Community, it was deemed to be present in the Community.
72  T h i s  w a s  
considered consistent with the territoriality principle because it was based on physical location.  
This solution soon proved to be inadequate.  An anticompetitive practice may be engaged in by 
companies entirely outside the EC and which have no subsidiaries or affiliates in the EC.  In 
Åhlstrom Osukeyhtiö v. Commission, the ECJ introduced a new concept designed to address this 
shortcoming.
73  In that case, the ECJ recognized that the actual location of the parties or their 
subsidiaries was not the decisive criterion in delineating the jurisdictional reach of the European 
competition laws.  As long as the conduct was “implemented” in the Community, the 
Commission and European courts could legitimately assert jurisdiction over the conduct.
74  The 
implementation requirement is simply another name for the effects test.  It is unlikely that the 
Commission or ECJ would conclude that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over conduct 
which had an anti-competitive effect in Europe because it was not implemented there.  It is 
difficult to see how a business practice could have an anti-competitive effect without being 
implemented in that same area. 
  Reliance on the effects/implementation test to delineate the scope of application of 
competition laws appears to have become a generally accepted principle.
75  The extension of 
jurisdiction based on the location of the effects creates the potential of the parallel application of 
competition laws to the same conduct as anti-competitive conduct may have negative effects or 
may be implemented in more than one jurisdiction.  Not only does the extraterritorial application 
of competition law in itself cause animosities, divergent legal conclusions resulting from the 
application of national legal norms to particular business conduct often result in legal and 
political friction.
76  
 
  Internationalization and harmonization describe different forms of multi-lateral or 
bilateral solutions to address the divergent consequences of the parallel application of two or 
more legal norms to the same conduct.  Internationalization refers to the adoption of a supra-
national set of directly applicable laws.  In the context of competition law, for example, it 
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commonly refers to the adoption of a single competition law regime applicable in each state.
77  
Harmonization, on the other hand, refers generally to the process by which national legal norms 
are assimilated with one another.  In contrast to internationalization, each state retains its own 
domestic laws applicable to the particular conduct.  The term harmonization implies the retention 
of national laws with modifications to harmonize them with the laws of the other states.   
 
  Some observers distinguish between hard harmonization and soft harmonization.
78  Hard 
harmonization is used to refer to the creation of supra-national legal norms regulating 
competition. This is essentially the same as internationalization as discussed above.  The term 
“soft harmonization” is commonly used to describe the intentional approximation of substantive 
or procedural rules.
79  A commonly-cited example of soft harmonization is the assimilation of 
national laws to the various non-binding model codes or best practices guidelines issued by the 
OECD.  
 
  This definition of soft harmonization fails to capture the influenced but unintentional 
approximation of laws which often occurs but is more difficult to detect.  If harmonization 
includes the agreed-upon changing of laws to conform with one another, a third phenomenon 
“convergence” should be mentioned as it also contributes to the reduction of the risk of friction 
resulting from the parallel application of competition laws to the same conduct.  For example, the 
divestiture policy of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission had a strong influence on the EU 
approach to remedies in merger cases.
80  The introduction of a leniency policy
81 and efficiency 
considerations
82 in EU competition and merger law may also be cited as examples of 
convergence.  Although the modernization of the EU competition laws has not been 
characterized as or undertaken for the purpose of harmonization or convergence, its effect is to 
move the European system more into line with that of the U.S.  Consequently, the modernization 
should assist in reducing the private inefficiencies and political disputes which periodically arise 
from the parallel application of EU and U.S. antitrust law. 
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Modernization as Convergence 
 
Although the European Commission has welcomed efforts to harmonize U.S. and European law, 
convergence was clearly not the objective of the reform efforts.  However, it does have this 
effect is subtle ways.  As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a holistic approach 
to determining whether particular conduct constituted a restraint of competition.  Except for 
conduct which was so pernicious that it could not have any redeeming characteristics and is 
deemed to be per se anti-competitive,
83 business conduct is only deemed anti-competitive after 
an analysis of all relevant aspects of the conduct.
84  As vague as it may seem to Europeans, 
reasonableness is the dominant standard. 
 
  The traditional European approach was much different.  The prohibition of anti-
competitive conduct codified in Art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty has traditionally been interpreted 
very broadly.  In applying this part of Art. 81, the Commission, with the approval of the 
Community courts, refused to consider whether the conduct at issue as a whole was anti-
competitive.  Only the potential negative characteristics of the conduct were considered at this 
stage in the analysis.  Even conduct which served to increase competition on the relevant market 
was nonetheless prohibited by paragraph (1) of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty.  The redeeming 
characteristics were irrelevant at this stage of the analysis.
85 
 
  It was only once the parties entered the realm of Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty that the pro-
competitive aspects became relevant.
86  But one could not enter this realm until the parties 
submitted a costly and time consuming notification to the European Commission.
87  This bi-
furcated system unfortunately caused a misallocation of scarce administrative resources and 
imposed significant compliance costs on firms.  Two companies who wanted to cooperate to 
develop and new product or engage in joint marketing activities, were often forced to expend 
time and financial resources on filing a notification – and the Commission was likewise 
obligated to expend resources to review it even if the cooperation were pro-competitive. 
 
  The central component of the modernization program will be to eliminate this bifurcated 
system of application of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty.  As in the U.S., whether particular business 
conduct amounts to a restraint of competition will require a simultaneous examination of both 
the negative and positive effects of that conduct.  This convergence with the U.S. systematic may 
assist in the reduction of friction between the U.S. and Europeans in the antitrust arena.  In the 
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pre-modernization age, many U.S. practitioners and businesses objected to the bi-furcated system 
employed by the Commission.  They could not understand the necessity of having to notify a 
pro-competitive transaction and incurring the consequent scrutiny of the European regulators.  
This alternative approach to the implementation of competition law was perceived as not being 
business-friendly.  It consequently clouded the legitimacy of European competition law and 
created the general perception that European competition law was inefficient and susceptible to 
bias.  In the post-modernization age, the approaches taken by businesses and their legal advisors 
will be substantially similar.  The fundamental task will be to determine whether a particular 
business conduct is in the aggregate pro-competitive.  It will not eliminate the potential for 
different outcomes to the application of the substantive standard, but it will contribute to 
enhancing the reputation of European competition law in the U.S. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although modernization of law can be a legitimate response to social changes for which the 
existing legal norms are inadequate,
88 it can be used as a guise for changing the legal status quo 
to achieve concrete political objectives.  Some have argued that the modernization program 
initiated by the Commission has the dubious effect of centralizing enforcement around the 
Commission.
89  Although the relegation of national competition law is predicted, this essay is not 
meant to suggest any illegitimate motives behind the modernization process in the EU.   
Regardless of the objectively demonstrable intent of the promoters of the legislative reforms 
which constitute the modernization process, one effect of modernization is to achieve a greater 
degree of harmonization with U.S. antitrust law.  
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